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In dealing with the influence of political considerations on the Constitutional Court's 
interpretation and application of the Bill of Rights it appears to be useful to first 
consider the meaning of "politics" in the judicial context, then to determine the 
considerations when politics are alleged to require the recusal of a judge and lastly 
to describe the Constitutional Court's position on judges and politics.  
  
1 POLITICS  
  
I have not been able to find a judicial definition of "politics" or "political".  Most 
dictionary definitions of these terms refer to government and the state, opinions or 
attitudes regarding choices to be made regarding government and association with a 
group or party promoting a particular approach to government.  For present 
purposes, therefore, the opinions, preferences or attitudes of judicial officers 
regarding the manner in which the country should be governed and by whom, will be 
the focus of this analysis.  In the highly institutionalised area of contemporary party 
politics, the meaning of "politics" is easily reduced to support for a specific political 
party or grouping.  
  
It would appear that the Court considers it unavoidable that its judgments will in 
certain "crucial political areas" within its jurisdiction have "political consequences".  
These areas constitute the core of the constitutionally allocated areas of jurisdiction 
of the Court, viz. disputes between organs of state, decisions on the constitutionality 
of Bills and legislation, amendments to the Constitution and of the conduct of the 
President.
1
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The Court recently found it necessary in the Van Rooyen case
2
 (in which the 
constitutionality of the legislation and regulations pertaining to the magistrates' courts 
had to be adjudicated) to quote the following passage from the famous judgment of 
the Appellate Division in Minister of the Interior v Harris
3
 where Schreiner JA stated 
that:  
  
[t]he Superior Courts of South Africa have at least for many generations had 
characteristics which, rooted in the world’s experience, are calculated to ensure, 
within the limits of human frailty, the efficient and honest administration of justice 
according to law.  Our Courts are manned by full-time Judges trained in the law, 
who are outside party politics and have no personal interest in the cases which 
come before them, whose tenure of office and emoluments are protected by law 
and whose independence is a major source of the security and well-being of the 
state.  
  
Chaskalson CJ followed this quotation with the following:
4
  
  
Under our new constitutional order much has changed since then and more 
changes are foreshadowed in the bill presently before Parliament.
5
  As was 
previously mentioned, judges are now appointed by the President on the 
recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission.
6
  Their salaries and 
benefits cannot be reduced,
7
 and a decision of the Judicial Service 
Commission supported by a resolution of two thirds of the members of the 
National Assembly is required for impeachment.
8
  Salaries and conditions of 
service are still fixed by regulation, but the Bill makes provision for an 
independent commission to make recommendations to government on the 
remuneration of judges.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1    Paras [72] and [73] of the SARFU recusal judgment:  "Section 167(4) thus confers exclusive jurisdiction to 
this Court in a number of crucial political areas which include the power to decide disputes between organs 
of state in the national and provincial sphere, to decide on the constitutionality of any parliamentary or 
provincial Bill, to decide on the constitutionality of any amendment to the Constitution and to decide whether 
Parliament or the President has failed to fulfil a constitutional obligation.  And, in terms of section 167(4), 
this Court makes the final decision whether an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or conduct of the 
President is constitutional.    . . . It follows that the drafters of the Constitution necessarily envisaged that 
this Court would be called upon to adjudicate finally in respect of issues which would inevitably have 
important political consequences."  
2    Van Rooyen v The State 2002 5 SA 246 (CC) para [82].  
3    1952 4 SA 769 (A) at 789.  
4    Para [83].  
5    Judicial Officers Amendment Bill 72 of 2001.  
6    Section 174(6) of the Constitution.  
7    Section 176(3) of the Constitution.  
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Over time the attitude of the South African bench toward matters of politics and 
policy has received much attention.  A useful historical mirror of current judicial 
thinking is to be found in Professor John Dugard's inaugural lecture of 1971
9
 in 
which he endeavoured to expose the endemic positivism in the judicial thinking of 
the time and the judges' refusal to recognise their own "inarticulate premises".  As a 
solution he offered two "antidotes"
10
:  
  
First, a frank recognition on the part of the judiciary that their role is not purely 
mechanical;  . . . and that in disputes between individual and State subconscious 
personal preferences are an ever-present hazard.  Secondly, what is needed is a 
conscious determination by judges to be guided by accepted traditional legal values 
. . .   
  
For present purposes a useful opening to an investigation into the influence of 
politics on the judiciary is to be found in the two judgments of the Court dealing with 
recusal, viz. the SARFU recusal case
11
 and the SACCAWU case.
12
  
  
 
2  RECUSAL  
  
The matter of recusal of a judicial officer is of key importance to the development of 
practical guidelines for courts confronted with issues of a political nature.  The main 
judgment of the Court dealing with recusal, is that of the SARFU recusal case, in 
which justices of the Court were requested to recuse themselves from the case in 
which the appellant was the President of South Africa, who had appointed them to 
the bench of the Court.  Much of the detailed grounds for the recusal application 
concerned the past political activities and affiliation of the justices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8    Section 177 of the Constitution.  
9    Dugard  1971 SALJ 181.  
10   At 195  
11   President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 1999 4 SA 147 (CC).  
12   South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union v Irvin and Johnson Ltd 2000 3 SA 705 (CC).  
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The essential test for recusal has been formulated as follows:  
  
The question is whether a reasonable, objective and informed person would on the 
correct facts reasonably apprehend that the judge has not or will not bring an 
impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the case, that is a mind open to 
persuasion by the evidence and the submissions of counsel.  The reasonableness 
of the apprehension must be assessed in the light of the oath of office taken by the 
judges to administer justice without fear or favour; and their ability to carry out that 
oath by reason of their training and experience.  It must be assumed that they can 
disabuse their minds of any irrelevant personal beliefs or predispositions.  They 
must take into account the fact that they have a duty to sit in any case in which they 
are not obliged to recuse themselves.  At the same time, it must never be forgotten 
that an impartial judge is a fundamental prerequisite for a fair trial and a judicial 
officer should not hesitate to recuse herself or himself if there are reasonable 
grounds on the part of a litigant for apprehending that the judicial officer, for 
whatever reasons, was not or will not be impartial.
13
  
  
The judgment in the SACCAWU case (deliverd by Cameron AJ, who was not a 
member of the bench that deciced the SARFU recusal case), provides some useful 
analyses of the former judgment.  The Court pointed out that the following 
considerations are prominent in the test for recusal:
14
  
  
1. A presumption that judicial officers are impartial in adjudicating disputes.  
Consequently —  
• the applicant for recusal bears the onus of rebutting the presumption of 
judicial impartiality, and  
• it is a strong presumption, rebuttal of which requires cogent or convincing 
evidence.  
2. Because judges are human, their life experiences will unavoidably influence 
their understanding of judicial duties.  "Absolute neutrality" in the judicial 
context is therefore not achievable..  
3. Judicial impartiality, clearly dinstinguised from "colourless neutrality", is 
however an absolute requirement for a civilised system of adjudication.  Such 
impartiality the Court defines as "that quality of open-minded readiness to 
persuasion – without unfitting adherence to either party or to the Judges's 
own predelictions, preconceptions and personal views."  In practical terms, 
therefore, "a mind open to persuasion by the evidence and the submissions of 
counsel."  
4. A "double requirement of reasonableness":    
• the person concerned about the danger of judicial bias must be a 
reasonable person, and  
• the concern ("apprehension") itself must be reasonable in the 
circumstances.
15
  
 
13   Para [48] of the SARFU recusal case.  
14   SACCAWU case paras [12] – [17].  
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Anxiety on the part of the litigant requesting recusal, however strong and 
honest, is therefore not sufficient:  " The court must carefully scrutinise the 
apprehension to determine whether it is to be regarded as reasonable.  In 
adjudging this, the court superimposes a normative assessment on the 
litigant’s anxieties.  It attributes to the litigant’s apprehension a legal value, 
and thereby decides whether it is such that it should be countenanced in 
law."
16
  
5. In recusal applications, two contending factors need to be weighed:  
• ill-founded and misdirected challenges to the composition of a bench 
should be discouraged, and  
• public confidence in impartial adjudication must be maintained.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15   Cf also S v Roberts 1999 4 SA 915 (SCA) para [32] approvingly referred to by the Court in the SACCAWU   
judgment (para [14]).  
16   Para [16] of the SACCAWU judgment.  
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3  JUDGES AND POLITICS  
  
Regarding the specific issue of the political opinions of judicial officers, the SARFU 
recusal case contains a number of relevant dicta which produced the following 
opinions:  
• Because courts are required to give reasons for their judgments, criticism 
of the judgments should be focused on those reasons and not be 
motivated by political discontent or dissatisfaction with the outcome.
17
  In 
the Mamabolo case
18
 the Court added that a court must in its judgments 
"rely on moral authority".  
• A judicial officer's constitutional duty is to "resist all manner of pressure, 
regardless of where it comes from."
19
  
• The Constitution requires of a judicial officer to adjudicate a case 
"according to the facts and the law, and not according to their subjective 
personal views."
20
  
• Because the core values of the Constitution are in contrast to the 
pre-constitutional dispensation, political opposition in pre-constitutional 
times to the old order is practically a requirement for appointment to the 
bench of the Constitutional Court.
21
  
• Nevertheless "all judges are expected to put any party political loyalties 
behind them on their appointment and it is generally accepted that they 
do so."
22
  
• In the opinion of the Court
23
 "it follows that a reasonable apprehension of 
bias cannot be based upon political associations or activities of judges 
prior to their appointment to the bench unless the subject matter of the 
litigation in question arises from such associations or activities."  
 
 
17   Para [68]  "Success or failure of the government or any other litigant is neither grounds for praise nor for  
condemnation of a court.  What is important is whether the decisions are good in law, and whether they are 
justifiable in relation to the reasons given for them.  There is an unfortunate tendency for decisions of 
courts with which there is disagreement to be attacked by impugning the integrity of the judges, rather than 
by examining the reasons for the judgment.  Our courts furnish detailed reasons for their decisions, and 
particularly in constitutional matters, frequently draw on international human rights jurisprudence to explain 
why particular principles have been laid down or applied.  Decisions of our courts are not immune from 
criticism.  But political discontent or dissatisfaction with the outcome of a case is no justification for 
recklessly attacking the integrity of judicial officers."  
18   S v Mamabolo 2001 3 SA 409 (CC) para [16] per Kriegler j: "In our constitutional order the judiciary is an  
 independent pillar of state, constitutionally mandated to exercise the judicial authority of the state fearlessly 
and impartially.  Under the doctrine of separation of powers it stands on an equal footing with the executive 
and the legislative pillars of state; but in terms of political, financial or military power it cannot hope to 
compete.  It is in these terms by far the weakest of the three pillars; yet its manifest independence and 
authority are essential.  Having no constituency, no purse and no sword, the judiciary must rely on moral 
authority.  Without such authority it cannot perform its vital function as the interpreter of the Constitution, 
the arbiter in disputes between organs of state and, ultimately, as the watchdog over the Constitution and 
its Bill of Rights — even against the state."  
19   Para [104]  ". . .  The nature of the judicial function involves the performance of difficult and at times  
unpleasant tasks.  Judicial officers are nonetheless required to "administer justice to all persons alike 
without fear, favour or prejudice, in accordance with the Constitution and the law."  To this end they must 
resist all manner of pressure, regardless of where it comes from.  This is the consitutional duty common to 
all judicial officers.  If they deviate, the independence of the Judiciary would be undermined, and in turn, 
the Constitution itself."  
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 20  Para [70]  "That a judge may have engaged in political activity prior to appointment to the bench is not 
uncommon in most if not all democracies including our own.  Nor should it surprise anyone in this country.  
Upon appointment, judges are frequently obliged to adjudicate disputes, which have political consequences.  
It has never been seriously suggested that judges do not have political preferences or views on law and 
society.  Indeed, a judge who is so remote from the world that she or he has no such views would hardly be 
qualified to sit as a judge.  What is required of judges is that they should decide cases that come before 
them without fear or favour according to the facts and the law, and not according to their subjective 
personal views.  This is what the Constitution requires."  
21   Para [72]  "The core values of our new order are reflected in the provisions of section 1 of the Constitution.  
None of those values was recognised by the old order, which was replaced by the Constitution.  Where we 
used to have a supreme Parliament, we now have a supreme Constitution.  The Constitutional Court has 
been given the responsibility of being the ultimate guardian of the Constitution and its values."  And para 
[74]:  ". . . it would be surprising if respect and support for the core values of the Constitution by candidates 
for appointment to all of our courts, and particularly the Constitutional Court, were not taken into account by 
the Judicial Service Commission when preparing a list of nominees for submission to the President.  It 
would be equally surprising if the President and the Cabinet failed to do so.  Barely five years into the new 
order it is all but inevitable that in the professional or public lives of such candidates their antipathy and 
opposition to the evils and immorality of the old order, to a greater or lesser extent, would have manifested 
themselves.  The public hearings of the Judicial Service Commission reflect this reality."  
22   Para [75] then continues:  "In South Africa, so soon after our transition to democracy, it would be surprising 
if many candidates for appointment to the bench had not been active in or publicly sympathetic towards the 
liberation struggle.  It would be ironic and a matter for regret if they were not eligible for appointment by 
reason of that kind of activity."  
23   Para [76].  
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4 COMMENTS  
  
For the consideration of the question how a judicial officer should deal with personal 
political convictions when required to adjudicate in matters which have political 
implications, at least the following should be considered:  
  
1. There is a distinction between politically motivated judgments, and judgments 
having political consequences.  A judicial officer has no choice or control over 
the latter situation, which is brought about objectively due simply to the nature of 
the jurisdiction of the court.  A politically motivated judgment is however 
engendered entirely through the subjective predisposition of a judge.  The 
challenge to the bench is not to produce politically motivated judgments in cases 
having political consequences.  
2. To achieve this, requires great effort and it remains open whether it can actually 
be done.  It helps that adjudication requires the justification of the decision.  The 
conventional wisdom is that justice is achieved by an objective analysis of the 
facts followed by the objective application of the law to those facts.  If it is 
impossible for a person to be divorced from ingrained presuppositions and 
premises, can a judge be expected to deliberately go against all instincts in order 
to achieve justice?  
3. Perhaps an answer must be sought not in what goes on in the mind of the judge, 
but in the standards of justice to which decisions must comply . . . .  
 
  
